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Abstract
Panel data analysis has become very popular in comparative political economy.
However, in order to draw meaningful inferences from such data, one has to ad-
dress specification and estimation issues carefully. This paper aims to demon-
strate various pitfalls that typically occur in applied empirical work. To illustrate
this, we refer to the debate on the globalization-welfare state nexus. We re-
examine a model by Garrett and Mitchell (2001), a leading study in this regard.
Utilizing a data set of 17 OECD countries and the time period 1961 to 1993, they
find evidence that globalization and partisan composition have a significant im-
pact on the extent of public activity. However, because they apply a dynamic
specification in levels, they do not adequately take into account both the dynamic
and spherical nature of the data. In contrast, we propose an autoregressive
model in first differences that is shown to perform well in statistical terms. Fur-
ther, we explicitly pay attention to the time pattern of the globalization-welfare
state nexus. Substantively, we find evidence that government spending is pri-
marily driven by the state of the domestic economy. Neither partisan effects nor
the international economic environment have affected public expenditure con-
siderably.
Zusammenfassung
Panel-Daten erfreuen sich in politisch-ökonomischen Analysen zunehmender
Beliebtheit. Allerdings enthalten derartige Daten einige ökonometrische Fallstri-
cke, die wir in der vorliegenden Arbeit aufzeigen. Zur Illustration nehmen wir
auf die Diskussion über den Zusammenhang zwischen Globalisierung und
Wohlfahrtsstaat Bezug. Dazu greifen wir eine Arbeit von Garrett und Mitchell
(2001) auf, in der gezeigt wird, dass Globalisierung und die parteimäßige Zu-
sammensetzung der Regierung einen signifikanten Einfluss auf die Staatstätig-
keit ausüben. Wir argumentieren, dass dieses Ergebnis von ihrer Modellspezifi-
kation (dynamische Spezifikation in Niveaugrößen) getrieben wird. Demgegen-
über zeigen wir, dass in der vorliegenden Datenkonstellation die statistischen
Eigenschaften des Störterms ökonometrisch korrekt nur durch ein autoregressi-
ves Modell in ersten Differenzen berücksichtigt werden können. Unter Beach-
tung von unterschiedlichen Phasen der Internationalisierung finden wir weiters,
dass die Staatsausgabentätigkeit primär durch binnenwirtschaftliche Faktoren
erklärt wird. Weder Parteieneffekte noch „Globalisierungsphänomene“ haben
die Veränderung der Staatsausgaben nennenswert beeinflusst.
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1 Introduction
“Regression models make it all too easy to substitute technique for work.”
(David A. Freedman 1991: 300)
During the 1990s, advances in the statistical methodologies used for assessing
hypotheses on the interrelations between economic developments and political
institutions have been impressive. The availability of data for a set of usually
about 15 to 25 OECD countries over a period of up to about 40 years has placed
techniques of panel data analysis in the forefront of applied research. It is no ex-
aggeration to say that it has become difficult to defend the decision not to use
panel data in the analysis of comparative political economy.
At least, the importance of panel data analysis is well documented in recent
studies on the relationship between globalization and the several dimensions of
the welfare state. There are two conflicting views on this issue (Schulze/Ur-
sprung 1999): The efficiency hypothesis states that the emerging internationalization
of the economies induces a downward pressure on tax rates and government
spending (e.g. Bretschger/Hettich 2001; Rodrik 1997, 1998; Swank/Steinmo
2001). In contrast, the compensation hypothesis (see Cameron 1978; Katzenstein
1985) claims that increasing factor mobility is associated with a higher demand on
social security, which in turn causes an upward shift of taxation and spending
levels (Garrett 1995, 1998; Hicks/Swank 1992; Huber/Stephens 2001; Quinn
1997; Swank 1998; ambivalent evidence is given by Garrett/Mitchell 2001). An
emerging line of reasoning aims to overcome the simplified juxtaposition of effi-
ciency and compensation by drawing attention to the complex interaction of
various institutional determinants (e.g. Ganghof 2001), an advance attained at the
price of losing quantitative information.
This paper is motivated out of the concern that the use of panel data analysis as a
universal remedy for all the problems of cross-country comparative analysis has
led the field into an impasse. In the debate on the globalization-welfare state
nexus, the impasse appears at three levels:
                                                  
Major parts of this paper were written during a visit of Hannes Winner (Institute of Pub-
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Steffen Ganghof, Philipp Rehm, and Fritz Scharpf for their useful comments.
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1. Little effort is made to develop a concise theory as to why specific variables
are entered into a regression and how they are related to each other. Instead,
we observe the discussion of singular, often ad hoc, propositions under the
guise of hypotheses. Sometimes, this is associated with an unreflecting use of
theoretical concepts (for a critique, see Moses 2001).
2. We observe empirical specifications that rarely discuss the assumptions
about the spherical nature of the data. Specifically, numerous studies simply
take for granted the finding of Beck and Katz (1995) that panel data tend to
violate the classical assumptions of the error term (groupwise heteroskedas-
ticity, cross-sectional and serial correlation) and regard autoregressive mod-
els with panel-corrected standard errors as a panacea. However, Beck and
Katz (1995: 645; see also Greene 2000: 592–607) argue that it is necessary to
test the assumptions on the error term before applying such correction, a sug-
gestion that is often ignored in applied empirical work. Further, the problems
induced by the time dimension of pooled data, notably due to nonstationary
data, are often underestimated.
3. Consequently, the combination of weak theoretical reasoning and an am-
bivalent statistical foundation results in highly problematic conclusions.
This paper focuses exclusively on the second level, the statistical modeling of the
globalization-welfare state nexus. Although we suspect that this is close to being
the paramount problem in recent quantitative contributions to comparative po-
litical economy, we will not address the topic in a generalized manner. Instead,
we will discuss the problem by reanalyzing a data set used in a recent paper by
Geoffrey Garrett and Deborah Mitchell (2001). Utilizing panel data for 17 OECD
countries and the time period 1961 to 1993,1 they find evidence that globalization
and the partisan composition of governments have a serious impact on revenue
and expenditure levels. In developing this result, they claim credit for applying
state-of-the-art econometric techniques.2 However, their study – though stimu-
lating in many respects – exemplifies very clearly the various pitfalls we may en-
counter when analyzing panel data.
                                                  
1 Garrett and Mitchell (2001) claim to use 18 countries. However, due to missing val-
ues for New Zealand they actually base their inferences on 17 countries. Similarly,
although the time period extends from 1961 to 1994, they only use data up to 1993.
2 This claim comes only implicitly in the paper (e.g., Garrett/Mitchell 2001: 153). In his
widely celebrated earlier contribution, Garrett (1998: 10) claims to apply “the most
appropriate econometric techniques to test the empirical merits of my arguments”
and recommends the book as a means to overcome the ignorance of economists and
policy makers about the work of political scientists, an ignorance that he feels is
caused by the hitherto applied statistical methodology.
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Our emphasis on model selection, specification and estimation issues implies that
we do not directly address the question concerning which substantive variables
should be included to explain the extent of government expenditure (see, for ex-
ample, Mueller 1989: 320–347; or, more recently, Holsey/Borcherding 1997 for an
overview). Consequently, we do not discuss the theoretical justification of the in-
clusion of particular variables but proceed from the variables included by Garrett
and Mitchell (2001). Our contribution is to explore the statistical properties of dif-
ferent assumptions salient to panel data. By reassessing the empirical results of
Garrett and Mitchell (2001), we demonstrate that model specifications widely
used in the globalization literature typically suffer from misspecifications. Worse,
the parameter estimates are usually biased, inefficient, as well as inconsistent,
thereby placing the validity of the inferences drawn from these studies at stake.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces a static panel data model
and discusses the implications of controlling for cross-sectional and time-specific
idiosyncrasies. Section 3 re-estimates the dynamic model specification of Garrett
and Mitchell (2001) and demonstrates the major shortcomings therein. Section 4
shifts to a dynamic specification in first differences and discusses the justification
of this model. Section 5 addresses issues of the country- and time-dependency of
our findings. Section 6 presents our conclusions.
2 Static Model
We focus our discussion of model specification on one of the models presented by
Garrett and Mitchell (2001). More specifically, we have chosen the ‘total spend-
ing’-model in the first column of their Table 5 (Garrett/Mitchell 2001: 166), re-
printed as the column indicated by “G/M” in our Table 5, on which they base
their discussion of the relationship between total government expenditure (de-
fined as a percentage of GDP) and the partisan composition of government as
well as economic internationalization. While partisan composition is measured as
the share of leftist (LEFT) and Christian democratic parties (CDEM) in govern-
ment, the proxy for globalization consists of trade openness (imports plus exports
related to GDP, TRADE), the share of imports from low-wage countries on total
imports (LOWWAGE), and flows of foreign direct investment (FDI). In addition,
Garrett and Mitchell introduce three control variables: the unemployment rate,
GDP growth per capita, and the dependency ratio (defined as the share of citizens
aged above 60 and below 19). Although the choice of the total spending model for
our discussion seems somewhat arbitrary given the other models presented in
their paper, two reasons make it a reasonable choice: First, total government ex-
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penditure is a crucial dependent variable in the substantive argument made by
Garrett and Mitchell (2001), and second, the model has properties along which
the problems of model specification in the pooled context can be exemplified
rather clearly.3 It should be noted, however, that the remaining specifications of
Garrett and Mitchell (2001) not discussed here suffer from similar deficiencies. In
order to motivate our modeling decisions, we proceed step by step.
We start by exploring the panel structure of the model. Without further testing
we assume poolability of the data in the sense that the estimation of one coeffi-
cient over ‘space’ and ‘time’ for each variable is a reasonable approximation to re-
ality. Since this is a rather far-reaching assumption, it needs some further atten-
tion (see Hsiao 1986: 11 on poolability tests). If this assumption does not hold –
which often occurs in practice – we have to go back either to pure time series
analysis and/or cross-sectional regressions (Hsiao/Sun 2000; Pesaran/Shin/
Smith 1999) or to shift to the seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) framework
(Zellner 1962). A third option would be to move into the realm of random coeffi-
cients (Beck/Katz 2001a; Swamy 1971; Western 1998), which is an interesting al-
ternative if we are not concerned about the nature of the cross sections. This is
reasonable for individual-level analyses, e.g. in a typical household panel, where
we wish to make inferences from a sample to a larger population. However, in a
set of OECD countries, we are primarily interested in the country-specific situa-
tion. Moreover, the random coefficients approach assumes that the cross sections
and the independent variables are uncorrelated, an assumption that is seldom ful-
filled (see Hsiao 1986: 131). Hence, in the context of a small set of OECD coun-
tries, following one of the first two avenues seems to be the most valid conclusion
if poolability tests fail. Since our aim is to discuss specification issues in the analy-
sis of panel data in comparative political economy, we do not follow this lead
here.
To decide to reject poolability means to sacrifice the feature that most compara-
tive political economists regard as one of the prime advantages of panel data sets:
the (often only apparent) increase in degrees of freedom obtained by repeating
cross-sectional observations over time (see Hsiao 1986: 2). Since much effort has
been put into the collection of panel data sets, and practically all published con-
tributions to comparative political economy using panel data assume poolability
by fiat, we simply note that this might be problematic and proceed to the next
                                                  
3 A practical reason is that the data set made available on the web did not contain the
data for covered interest rate differentials, which are used as additional proxy for
globalization. Garrett and Mitchell (2001) refer to data compiled by Shepherd (1994).
Unfortunately, this data set contains fewer observations than they have used for es-
timating their model for social expenditure, at least as far as can be inferred from the
number of observations mentioned in Table 5 (see Garrett/Mitchell 2001: 166).
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step, which is to impose common slopes but to allow for varying intercepts.
Hence we test for the need to include country and time effects.
Including country effects (known as the fixed effects, least squares-dummy vari-
ables, or within estimator) captures the unobserved country-specific variation in a
country-specific intercept. Since this removes the average country effect, such a
model focuses on the within-country variation over time, and the coefficients rep-
resent a cross-country average of the longitudinal effect. Time effects, in contrast,
capture developments over time that are common to all countries. This ‘within-
time’ estimator eliminates any common trends and external shocks to which all
countries are jointly exposed. The coefficient refers to the average cross-sectional
effect over time and takes into account shifts over time in the position of the
countries relative to each other. The variance of a coefficient estimate becomes
smaller, the greater the persistency of the relative position of the countries be-
comes on both the dependent and the independent variable. Combining both
country and time intercepts in a single specification results in a model from
which all unobserved country- and time-specific effects are removed. What re-
mains is a ‘pure’ effect, stripped of all exogenous noise and all variance compo-
nents that are constant in either the time or cross-section dimension. Finally, like
the within-time estimator, the ‘between estimator’ focuses on the cross-sectional
dimension but first removes the within-country variation by averaging over time
and then performs a cross-sectional regression on the country means.
Table 1 presents the various fixed-effects estimates and compares them to that of
the pooled OLS specification. At this point, we assume a static model in levels
and test whether the structure of the error term is adequately captured. Since
panel data typically exhibit serial correlation, cross-sectional correlation, and
groupwise heteroskedasticity (Greene 2000: 592–608), we expect to find such a
structure in the residuals. The lower block of Table 1 reports the tests we have
performed on the models. They suggest that we have to include both country and
time effects and that the residuals do indeed reveal the perceived panel structure.
Therefore, all of the significance tests in the upper block of Table 1 are invalid be-
cause the residuals do not conform to the OLS assumptions. Nevertheless, it is
worthwhile to explore the coefficient estimates and their standard errors because
they reveal a core problem of pooled analysis with political and institutional vari-
ables, which tend to be constant or which vary little over longer periods of time.
This is the case for leftist and Christian democratic cabinet portfolios. If we ignore
the bias in the standard errors, both coefficients are considerable in size and
highly significant in the pooled specification. Holding all the other variables con-
stant gives a 5.8 percentage point change in average total government expendi-
ture when moving from a government with 0 percent to one with 100 percent
leftist party participation. For Christian democratic parties this effect is smaller,
yielding 2.9 percentage points. However, as soon as the country effects are in-
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Table 1 Static Specification in Levels
Total Government Expenditure
POOL FE(C) FE(T) FE(CT) FE(CT)/PW
Unemployment 0.932***
(0.093)
1.262***
(0.106)
0.461***
(0.107)
0.706***
(0.080)
0.610***
(0.071)
GDP Growth/capita −0.901***
(0.130)
−0.817***
(0.085)
−0.758***
(0.153)
−0.510***
(0.069)
−0.196***
(0.028)
Dependency ratio −0.445***
(0.124)
−0.058
(0.143)
0.451***
(0.160)
1.329***
(0.111)
0.930***
(0.148)
Left cabinet
portfolios
5.802***
(0.872)
−1.209*
(0.699)
5.867***
(0.836)
−1.261***
(0.459)
−0.199
(0.318)
Christian democratic
portfolios
2.876**
(1.318)
−5.098***
(1.582)
7.219***
(1.362)
−0.784
(1.049)
0.302
(0.900)
Trade 0.129***
(0.015)
0.176***
(0.027)
0.118***
(0.015)
0.025
(0.020)
−0.021
(0.020)
Low wage imports −0.157***
(0.048)
−0.061
(0.048)
−0.018
(0.049)
0.338***
(0.035)
0.107***
(0.034)
Foreign direct
investment
0.093
(0.216)
0.420**
(0.167)
−0.154
(0.232)
0.142
(0.131)
−0.098
(0.079)
Rho .. .. .. .. 0.800
R2 0.584 0.482 0.480 0.941 ..
N (Observations) 529 529 529 529 529
k (Coeffficients) 9 25 40 56 57
F (Country effects) .. 54.41*** .. 146.66*** 714.27***
F (Time effects) .. .. 2.77*** 23.95*** 498.45***
F (Country &
time effects) .. .. .. 60.76*** 1088.18***
LM (CC), χ2 (136) 537.09*** 582.92*** 434.04*** 487.03*** 771.76***
Mod. Wald (GH),
χ2 (17) 1745.20*** 1131.27*** 14479.24*** 495.12*** 1001.69***
LM (AR1), χ2 (1) 471.48*** 408.86*** 474.42*** 365.72*** 447.60***
Notes: POOL = simple OLS on pooled specification; FE(C) = fixed country effects; FE(T) = fixed time effects;
FE(CT) = fixed country & time effects; PW = Prais-Winsten transformation; all models in this and the following
Tables refer to 17 OECD countries and the period 1963–1993; constant and fixed effects not shown α ≤ 0.10; ** α
≤ 0.05; *** α ≤ 0.01; Rho = autocorrelation coefficient; R2 = regression coefficient; N (observations) = total num-
ber of observations; k (coefficients) = number of estimated coefficients; F (Country effects) = F-Test for the in-
clusion of country dummies; F (Time effects) = F-Test for the inclusion of year dummies; F (Country & time
effects) = F-Test for the inclusion of both country and year dummies; LM(AR1): Lagrange-multiplier test for first
order residual serial correlation in panel data (Baltagi 2001: 95); degrees of freedom in parentheses; LM(CC):
Breusch-Pagan LM test for cross-sectional correlation (Greene 2000: 601); Mod. Wald(GH): modified Wald
test for groupwise heteroskedasticity (Greene 2000: 598); left cabinet portfolios and christian democratic cabi-
net portfolios are expressed as ratios instead of percentages in order to shift the coefficient estimates pre-
sented in the table.
.. = not applicable.
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cluded, both coefficients become negative but remain significant. Substituting
time effects for country effects turns the estimates back to positive coefficients
that are now considerably larger in the Christian democratic case. Finally, in-
cluding both effects makes the party coefficients both negative and now insignifi-
cant. Hence, the decision on how to model the fixed effects makes a real differ-
ence. Similar conclusions may be drawn for the dependency ratio, low-wage im-
ports and foreign direct investment. Contrary to the party coefficients, the coeffi-
cients of unemployment, economic growth per capita, and trade are much more
stable.
Here, we only discuss the party coefficients because they are the core variables in
most of the globalization literature. Their sign and significance is decisive in the
substantive interpretation of the salience of partisan effects that Garrett (1998)
strongly advocates. Why is the sign of partisanship unstable? The answer is two-
fold: First, in some of the countries – Canada and the USA for leftist cabinet port-
folios, and Australia, Canada, Ireland, Japan, and the UK for Christian democratic
portfolios – these variables do not vary over time. This implies that these coun-
tries do not enter the partisan estimates in the FE(C) specification because the
country effects remove all cross-sectional variation that otherwise would be cap-
tured by the partisanship variables.4 Since Canada and the USA both combine no
leftist government portfolios with low levels of government expenditure, their
exclusion from the sample in practice changes the estimate of the partisan effect
considerably. In addition, the partisanship variables have extremely small varia-
tion in a couple of other countries (e.g. Denmark, Finland, or Switzerland). Sec-
ond, by focusing on the longitudinal dimension, the static model in levels as-
sumes an immediate shift of government expenditure each time the partisan
composition of the government changes. While this is somewhat implausible,
notably due to the persistency of public expenditure, it is not surprising that the
significance of our estimates is rather low. Since the time effects – FE(T) – focus
on the cross-sectional dimension, the differences in total government expenditure
between the countries are captured without interference of the general upward
trend (which increases the variance of the coefficient estimates in the POOL speci-
fication), leading to more pronounced effects. The FE(CT) specification combines
both effects on the coefficient estimates, yielding a weighted average of both FE
specifications in which the weight depends on the relative variation in the two
dimensions (see Baltagi 2001: 31–33). Hence, from a substantive perspective, the
size and the sign of the coefficient estimates in the FE(CT) specification depend
on the practical exclusion of particular countries.5 We will come back to this issue
when discussing the dynamic specification (see Section 4).
                                                  
4 This is the way Garrett and Mitchell (2001: 168–169) interpret their exploration of the
impact of the fixed effects. We will come back to this later.
5 Similarly, Maddala (1999: 434) concludes: “Thus, choosing the countries used in the
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At this point it is useful to look at the results obtained from the between estima-
tor. Since this is a pure, cross-sectional regression on the country means, we do
not have to bother about the panel structure. Column 1 of Table 2 reports the re-
sults of the between regression. Despite the low degrees of freedom we find a
highly significant 23 percentage point difference between 0 percent and 100 per-
cent leftist portfolios. The model captures 66 percent of the variation in the de-
pendent variable. Since most coefficients are far from being significant, we re-
estimate a restricted specification including only the partisan effects and unem-
ployment, which failed the 10-percent significance level only by a narrow margin.
In the restricted specification, the coefficient of Christian democratic portfolios
                                                                                                                                                 
panel study is as crucial as (if not more than) the choice of the estimation method.”
Table 2 Static Specification in Levels: Between Estimator
Total Government Expenditure as a % of GDP
1 2
Unemployment 1.673
(1.100)
1.770**
(0.678)
GDP/capita growth 0.978
(2.711)
–
Dependency ratio −0.355
(1.346)
–
Left cabinet portfolios 23.445**
(9.651)
25.484***
(7.078)
Christian democratic portfolios 5.362
(10.080)
11.378*
(5.992)
Trade 0.083
(0.115)
–
Low wage imports −0.029
(0.382)
–
Foreign direct investment 0.915
(2.478)
–
R2 0.665 0.573
Nobs 17 17
k (coefficients) 9 4
White, χ2 (9) .. 6.40
Notes: see Table 1.
White: White (1980) general test for heteroskedasticity.
Constant included but not reported.
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becomes highly significant, too. Since the White (1980) test does not suggest the
presence of heteroskedasticity, we have decided to stick with this specification.
In contrast to the between estimator, the FE-specifications cannot clearly confirm
the presence of partisan effects. At this point, Garrett and Mitchell (2001: 169) de-
cide to interpret the country intercepts as an ‘equilibrium’ level of spending. We
see little reason to object to this approach if a substantive meaning can be attrib-
uted to the intercepts. This is the case if they can be read as long-term, steady-
state solutions. For example, Daveri and Tabellini (2000: 72) interpret the inter-
cepts in their unemployment model as the country-specific equilibrium unemploy-
ment in a NAIRU framework. In the present case, such an interpretation seems to
be inconsistent because Garrett and Mitchell (2001) do not provide a theoretical
model from which a steady state of government expenditure could be inferred.
In a less strict line of reasoning, one might claim that the country intercepts sim-
ply produce the average of the dependent variable as it is conditional on the other
explanatory variables. However, what does the average indicate if the variable is
nonstationary, as we will show below? And even if there is a reasonable answer
to this question, how do we deal with changes in government composition when
interpreting the intercepts? Finally, since the fitted country average is, as Garrett
and Mitchell (2001: 165) themselves note, the net of the effect of all regressors, the
average level cannot be attributed to partisan effects because these are already in-
cluded in the model.6
An alternative approach is to estimate a random effects model, which is pre-
sented in Table 3. This estimator is a weighted average of the within and the be-
tween estimators and is based on two (related) assumptions: First, the intercepts
are of no substantive relevance, which is the case in a large N, small T panel, and
second, the fixed effects and the regressors are uncorrelated (see Baltagi 2001: 15).
Although we could already reject random effects a priori because of the small
number of cross sections, the Hausman (1978) test for random country effects
specification – RE(C) – gives additional evidence that the fixed effects specifica-
tion is preferable.7 Hence we reject the random effects solution both on substan-
tive and on statistical grounds.
                                                  
6 Garrett and Mitchell (2001: 163) emphasize that country effects should be included in
order to capture idiosyncrasies and that any time-constant variable should be re-
garded as being part of the “underlying historic fabric of a country.” As Beck and
Katz (2001b) note (in the context of binary dependent variables), this argument
throws out the baby with the bath water, because one of the main interests of politi-
cal economists in this kind of quantitative analysis is determining whether institu-
tional variables capture cross-sectional variation to an extent that makes the inclusion
of country dummies unnecessary. Hence the ultimate aim is a model in which coun-
try effects are jointly insignificant.
7 Note that in the case of the random time effects specification – RE(T) – the estimator
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From this it follows that we are confronted with a considerable problem with re-
gard to the relationship of partisanship and public spending: While the between
estimator clearly indicates the presence of partisan effects on government expen-
diture, a pooled specification with both fixed country and time effects does not
confirm this finding. The standard econometric solution would be to instrument
                                                                                                                                                 
degenerates to the pooled estimator (as indicated by θ = 0.000; for details see Baltagi
2001: 18).
Table 3 Static Specification in Levels: Random Effects
Total Government Expenditure as a % of GDP
RE(C) RE(T)
Unemployment 1.239***
(0.102)
0.932***
(0.093)
GDP/capita growth −0.820***
(0.085)
−0.901***
(0.130)
Dependency ratio −0.095
(0.139)
−0.445***
(0.124)
Left cabinet portfolios −0.975
(0.693)
5.802***
(0.872)
Christian democratic portfolios −4.655***
(1.532)
0.029***
(0.013)
Trade 0.174***
(0.025)
0.129***
(0.015)
Low wage imports −0.069
(0.048)
−0.157***
(0.048)
Foreign direct investment 0.400**
(0.166)
0.093
(0.216)
R2 0.490 0.584
Median Theta 0.882 0.000
Nobs 529 529
Estimated coefficients 10 10
Breusch-Pagan 1763.80*** 0.25
Hausman 131.41*** 80.88***
Notes: see Table 1.
RE(C) = random country effects; RE(T) = random time effects.
Constant included but not reported.
Breusch-Pagan = Breusch-Pagan test OLS vs random effects.
Hausman = Hausman test random vs. fixed effects.
Kittel/Winner: How Reliable is Pooled Analysis in Political Economy? 15
the time invariant partisanship variables with the remaining independent vari-
ables (Hausman/Taylor 1981). However, since we are interested in the cross-
sectional variation – as is typically the focus of comparative political economics –
this solution is not viable here. An alternative would be to ignore the fixed coun-
try effects and to attempt to model the cross-sectional dimension via institutional
variables that capture enough of the cross-sectional variation to make the inclu-
sion of country effects insignificant. Unfortunately, such variables are usually not
available.
3 Dynamic Specification in Levels
It is well known from the panel literature that autocorrelation in the residuals, as
in the single time series case, causes seriously inefficient estimates. In principle,
there are two ways to deal with this issue (Beck/Katz 1995, 1996). On the one
hand, autocorrelation can be regarded as a nuisance in the residuals that has to be
corrected. On the other hand, autocorrelation may indicate persistency in the de-
pendent variable that can be captured by modeling an autoregressive process in-
cluding a lagged dependent variable. The relationship between the two ap-
proaches can be seen by noting that the autoregressive model is a special case of
the Cochrane-Orcutt transformation used for the autocorrelation-corrected model
in which the coefficients of the lagged independent variables are restricted to
zero.
To see this, consider a model with one exogenous regressor xit and an error term
following a first-order autoregressive process (for simplicity we do not consider
fixed effects)
 =  +  + , where (1)
 = − + 
with i denoting the ith country and t the tth time period, respectively. The error
term is  ~ IID (0,   ), as usual. The (one-step) Cochrane-Orcutt transformation
of (1) gives
− − = (1− ) + − −+  (2)
which is known as the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model (Greene
2000: 724). If ρβ = 0, which, given ρ ≠ 0, is the case if β = 0, (2) gives the first order
autoregressive specification
 = ∗ + − +  +  (3)
2
ν
16 MPIfG Discussion Paper 02/3
where α∗ = α (1– ). Equation (3) is the approach taken by Garrett and Mitchell
(2001), as by most contributions to comparative political economy. However, this
reasoning seems somewhat odd. If  has to be zero in (2), then equation (2) also
states that the effect of the level of xit on the partial adjustment process in yit (i.e.
yit– yi,t–1) has to be zero. In addition, equation (3) states that the effect of the level
of x on the level of y must be zero. Further,  has to be zero in (1), again suggest-
ing that x does not affect y. Otherwise,  has to be zero, which implies that there
is no autocorrelation in the residuals of (1) and a correction for autocorrelation is
not necessary. Hence, (3) is a mutilated version of (2), which is based on a rather
inconsistent restriction. Nevertheless, it often leads to plausible results and is
widely used in practice because, as can be seen from our specification, (3) has a
different substantive interpretation than (1) and (2). It refers to the effect of the
level of the regressor on the partial adjustment process in the level of the depend-
ent variable. Sometimes, it is possible to derive predictions for particular constel-
lations in which adjustment processes in the endogenous variable depend on the
levels of the regressors.
Before proceeding to the lagged dependent variable specification, we take a look
at the first approach, which explicitly models an AR(1) process in the residuals by
applying a Prais-Winston transformation. The result is reported in the last col-
umn of Table 1 (FE(CT)/PW, where PW refers to Prais-Winston). The estimate of
the autocorrelation coefficient ρ is quite large, 0.8, and compared to the FE(CT)
specification, the coefficients are shuffled again, notably those of the partisanship
variables.
Table 4 presents the findings for different dynamic specifications of the expendi-
ture model, which differ from Table 1 by the inclusion of a lagged dependent
variable. As in the static specification, the adequate model suggested by the F-
tests on country and time effects is the two-way fixed effects specification FE(CT).
This is the specification that Garrett and Mitchell (2001: 166) presented in the first
column of their Table 5 (and reproduced in our Table 5),8 except for the calcula-
tion of the standard errors that we will discuss later. For the moment, we will fo-
cus our discussion on the dynamic FE(CT) specification.
With respect to the partisan composition, the results may be interpreted as fol-
lows. From Table 1 we know that controlling for the country effects removes the
                                                  
8 We were unable to reproduce their results exactly, although we used the data set
published on Garrett’s webpage. The most serious deviation is the change in sign of
the FDI variable. One possible reason is that the procedure they used (xtpcse in
STATA 6) may be slightly different from ours (xtpcse in STATA 7). However, we be-
lieve that our estimates are close enough to proceed with our analysis. Note that we
shifted the partisanship effects by a factor 100 in order to obtain nicer table entries.
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Table 4 Dynamic Specification in Levels
Total Government Expenditure as a % of GDP
POOL FE(C) FE(T) FE(CT) FE(CT)a
Spending t-1 0.978***
(0.008)
0.935***
(0.012)
1.002***
(0.008)
0.914***
(0.019)
0.941***
(0.018)
Unemployment −0.079***
(0.019)
−0.001
(0.034)
−0.044**
(0.020)
0.021
(0.036)
GDP/capita growth −0.415***
(0.025)
−0.470***
(0.024)
−0.331***
(0.028)
−0.365***
(0.028)
Dependency ratio 0.058**
(0.023)
0.076*
(0.040)
−0.051*
(0.029)
0.084
(0.053)
Left cabinet portfolios 0.154
(0.169)
−0.025
(0.197)
−0.047
(0.160)
−0.225
(0.190)
Christian democratic
portfolios
0.361
(0.246)
−0.491
(0.449)
−0.210
(0.256)
−0.416
(0.432)
Trade 0.006*
(0.003)
−0.007
(0.008)
0.003
(0.003)
−0.026**
(0.008)
Low wage imports 0.010
(0.009)
0.008
(0.014)
−0.007
(0.009)
0.027*
(0.016)
Foreign direct
investment
−0.150***
(0.040)
−0.050
(0.047)
−0.109***
(0.042)
−0.007
(0.054)
R2 0.986 0.983 0.984 0.990 0.986
N (Observations) 529 529 529 529 529
k (Coefficients) 10 26 41 57 49
F (Country effects) .. 6.01*** .. 4.81*** 2.11***
F (Time effects) .. .. 3.57*** 3.01*** 7.61***
F (Country and
time effects)
.. .. .. 4.28*** 5.87***
F (Substantive
variables)
38.13*** 25.87***
LM (CC), χ2 (136) 174.12** 166.48** 147.88 146.87 222.00***
Mod. Wald (GH),
χ2 (17)
133.57*** 287.83*** 252.14*** 372.04*** 278.58***
LM (AR1), χ2 (1) 39.62*** 13.63*** 23.45*** 12.01*** 25.51***
Notes: see Table 1.
OLS = simple OLS; FE(C) = fixed country effects; FE(T) = fixed time effects; FE(CT) = fixed country & time
effects; constant and fixed effects included but not reported; Breusch-Godfrey LM = Test for first order residual
serial correlation.
.. = not applicable.
F (Substantive variables) = F-Test for the inclusion of all variables except the lagged dependent variable and
the fixed effects.
18 MPIfG Discussion Paper 02/3
positive association between leftist government participation and government
expenditure. Now we add a dynamic element. According to this specification, the
short-run impact of a shift from 0 percent to 100 percent leftist portfolios in gov-
ernment is to reduce government expenditure by (insignificant) 0.23 percentage
points. In the long run, this shift amounts to a decrease of 0.225/(1–0.914) = 2.62
percentage points. Thus, according to this model, leftist governments apparently
were better able to cut back government expenditure than conservative or Chris-
tian democratic governments. This is at odds with the existing evidence of parti-
san effects on one important element of government expenditure – social expen-
diture – which either found positive effects or no significant ones (for an over-
view, see Kittel/Obinger 2002).
Let us explore the model in more detail. First, note that the tests for groupwise
heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional correlation are highly significant. Hence it
seems reasonable to follow the recommendation by Beck and Katz (1995: 638) to
apply panel corrected standard errors. Table 5 reproduces the FE(CT) specifica-
tion using weighted least squares (the first step of the Parks-Kmenta FGLS proce-
dure) as well as OLS with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE). For the sake of
completeness, we also report the Prais-Winsten transformed specification –
FE(CT)/PW – from Table 1 with PCSEs (PCSE/AR1). The difference between the
OLS standard errors and the PCSE is minor. In effect, the PCSEs are somewhat
more permissive than the OLS standard errors and somewhat less optimistic than
the WLS standard errors. This is what we would expect given that the PCSEs
make use of the panel structure. While this makes them less efficient, it also
makes them – as Beck and Katz (1995) have stressed – more realistic than WLS.
We contend, however, that heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional correlation are
not the real problems in these data. Beck and Katz (1995) stress that autocorrela-
tion has to be handled adequately before their standard errors are calculated. In
the models presented in Tables 4 and 5, two problems are apparent: According to
the Breusch-Godfrey LM-test for serial correlation tabulated in the last rows of
Tables 4 and 5, none of the specifications is free of autocorrelation. An auxiliary
regression of the residuals on the lagged residuals still gives a highly significant
autocorrelation of 0.148 and Durbin’s m-test (Kmenta 1990: 333) gives a coeffi-
cient of 0.172, which is also highly significant. It is well known that in the pres-
ence of a lagged dependent variable, autocorrelation in the residuals prevents the
OLS estimate from remaining unbiased and consistent (Greene 2000: 534; for ap-
plications see Achen 2000). In addition, inserting a lagged dependent variable in a
model with fixed country effects induces an additional bias via the correlation
between the lagged dependent variable and the individual effects. Since yit is a
function of µi, the country effects, yi,t–1 is also a function of µi because µi is constant
over time (Baltagi 2001: 129–130; Kiviet 1995; Nickell 1981). The bias increases
with the magnitude of the autoregressive coefficient (for Monte Carlo evidence,
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see Judson/Owen 1999). Since the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is
above 0.9, this implies that we are confronted with a specification that is ridden
with bias in all parameter estimates. Hence, the substantive interpretation of the
coefficients and their standard errors is, as such, meaningless.
Table 5 Dynamic Specification in Levels: Correction for Heteroskedasticity
and Cross-sectional Correlation
Total Government Expenditure as a % of GDP
WLS PCSE G/M PCSE/AR1
Spending t-1 0.902***
(0.017)
0.914***
(0.024)
0.911*** –
Unemployment 0.061**
(0.031)
0.021
(0.039)
0.033 0.610***
(0.085)
GDP/capita growth −0.367***
(0.025)
−0.365***
(0.032)
−0.362*** −0.200***
(0.034)
Dependency ratio 0.092**
(0.040)
0.084*
(0.045)
0.097** 0.929***
(0.143)
Left cabinet portfoliosa −0.133
(0.172)
−0.225
(0.204)
−0.003 −0.198
(0.381)
Christian democratic
portfoliosa
−0.534*
(0.319)
−0.416
(0.373)
−0.005 0.303
(0.776)
Trade −0.029***
(0.008)
−0.026**
(0.011)
−0.030** 0.021
(0.028)
Low wage imports 0.036***
(0.013)
0.027
(0.017)
0.023 0.107***
(0.040)
Foreign direct investment −0.013
(0.048)
−0.007
(0.057)
0.006 −0.098
(0.088)
N (Observations) 529 529 529 529
k (Coefficients) 57 57 57 57
Rho .. .. – 0.801
LM (AR1), χ2 (1) 12.94*** 12.01*** – 447.65***
Notes: see Table 1.
WLS = Weighted Least Squares; PCSE = Panel-corrected Standard Errors; PCSE/AR1 = Panel-corrected
Standard Errors in Prais-Winsten transformed Model.
G/M = Coefficient estimates reported by Garrett and Mitchell (2001: 166) in the first column of their Table 5
(Note: They did not report standard errors but claim to use panel-corrected standard errors for the significance
tests designated by the stars).
Constant and fixed effects included but not reported.
.. = not applicable.
– = not reported.
a Our estimates and those reported by Garrett/Mitchell differ by a factor 100 because we have redefined
their percentage values as ratios in order to improve readability.
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These considerations give strong evidence that we have to reject the autoregres-
sive specification of Tables 3 and 4 and, by implication, that of Garrett and
Mitchell (2001). If we were able to get rid of autocorrelation, we would proceed
by an instrumental variable (IV) or a methods of moments (GMM) approach in
order to deal with the correlation between the country effects and the lagged de-
pendent variable (Baltagi 2001: 131–153). One approach that is sometimes sug-
gested is to add a second lag in order to capture the remaining autocorrelation.
However, the short-run and long-run relationships we are interested in are de-
rived by the coefficient estimate and the first-order lagged dependent variable
(for details see Greene 2000: 722). As the second-order lagged variable is super-
fluous for this calculation, there is no need to include this variable in the regres-
sion. Besides, it is hard to believe that a second-order lag would have any sub-
stantial meaning in our context.
A further problem relates to the extremely high autoregressive coefficient. As
Achen (2000) has pointed out, in some situations this coefficient artificially ‘in-
flates’ all variation because of the extreme persistency in the data. The compari-
son of Table 1 and Table 4 reveals that we are confronted with such a situation.
While the R2 of the POOL specification in Table 1 is 0.58, the FE(CT) specification
in Table 1 inflates this statistic to 0.94, and the lagged dependent variable further
inflates it to 0.99. In addition, we have the finding (reported in Table 4) that the R2
of a regression of government expenditure on lagged government expenditure –
the models in Table 4 skimmed of all regressors except the lagged dependent
variable – is 0.986. Hence, all regressors add only 0.4 percentage points (the corre-
sponding F-statistic of 0.25 is clearly insignificant) to the regression coefficient in
the presence of a lagged dependent variable. Nevertheless, the F-values reported
for the substantive variables – F = 38.13 for POOL and F = 25.87 for FE(CT) – indi-
cate that these variables jointly do significantly reduce the residuals sum of
squares. Also, the coefficient of the lagged variable is 0.941 (0.018), which sug-
gests that we might well be faced with a case of nonstationarity.9
A glance at the plots of expenditure to GDP ratio over time reveals that the analy-
sis may indeed be hampered by nonstationarity, more specifically by a I(1)-
stationary process (see Figures 1 and 2 in the Appendix). While the series of all
countries tend to rise over time, some countries seem to follow a trend and others
                                                  
9 We have also estimated a pooled model including no other variable than the lagged
dependent, yielding an autoregression coefficient of 0.991 (s.e. = 0.007). Hence, in-
cluding fixed effects does alleviate the problem of nonstationarity somewhat but
does not seem to solve it, as the IPS-tests below show. Technically, an autoregressive
coefficient above unity, as in the FE(T) specification of Table 4, violates the invertabil-
ity condition that is needed to reassure stable solutions in a stochastic process (see
Maddala/Kim 1998: 13). Consequently, the conventional unit roots tests turn out to
be invalid. See Elliott/Stock (2001) for tests on autoregressive coefficients near one.
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tend to be better characterized by a random walk. This suggests that we should
test for unit roots in a more systematic way. Table 6 presents the results of Levin-
Lin (LL) tests and Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS) tests for unit roots (for details, especially
on the difference between these tests, see Maddala/Wu 1999; see also Baltagi
2001: 236–239). The upper panel refers to the levels. According to LL, the data ap-
Table 6 Panel Unit Roots Tests
Total Government Expenditure: Levels
Levin & Lin coefficient t-value t* p
constant −0.113 −6.104 −0.871 0.192
constant, trend −0.170 −5.835 3.184 0.999
Im, Pesaran & Shin t-bar cv10 ψ p
demeaned, no trend −1.606 −1.780 −0.383 0.351
demeaned, trend −1.589 −2.410 2.727 0.997
not demeaned, no trend −1.226 −1.780 1.287 0.901
not demeaned, trend −1.733 −2.410 2.056 0.980
Total Government Expenditure: Changes
Levin & Lin coefficient t-value t* p
constant −0.836 −15.201 −10.030 0.000
constant, trend −0.911 −16.569 −9.201 0.000
Im, Pesaran & Shin t-bar cv10 ψ p
demeaned, no trend −3.684 −1.780 −9.498 0.000
demeaned, trend −3.921 −2.410 −8.162 0.000
not demeaned, no trend −3.580 −1.780 −9.044 0.000
not demeaned, trend −3.797 −2.410 −7.584 0.000
Note: These tests are performed on a restricted sample in order to meet the requirement of a balanced panel.
We have dropped Switzerland and the years 1991–1993. Dropping Switzerland and Norway but retaining the
years 1991–1993 did not change the results significantly, except for the not-demeaned IPS tests for the levels,
for which the p-value of ψ became clearly significant if the trend is excluded but clearly insignificant if the trend
is included. These considerable changes due to small changes to the sample suggest that the power of these
tests seems to be rather low.
Levin & Lin (1993) (LL) tests augmented by 1 lag, H0: nonstationarity.
coefficient: Coefficient on lagged levels.
t-value: t-value of coef.
t*: transformed t-value, ~N(0,1).
p: p-value of t*.
Im-Pesaran-Shin (1997) (IPS) tests augmented by 1 lag, H0: nonstationarity.
t-bar: mean of country-specific Dickey-Fuller tests.
cv10: 10% critical value of IPS test.
ψ: transformed t-bar statistic, ~N(0,1).
p: p-value of ψ.
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pear nonstationary. The IPS tests clearly confirm this finding. Demeaning (i.e.
removing the time effects) does not substantively alter the conclusions. Although
these tests are notorious for their low power (see Maddala/Kim 1998: 137), we
tend to be cautious and assume that the expenditure data are indeed nonstation-
ary, given the behavior over time as exhibited in Figure 1. If this assumption is
valid, this is an additional cause of bias and probably of spurious associations.
There are two approaches for dealing with nonstationary data. First, we could
remain in the single equation context and take first differences in order to pro-
ceed with a dynamic specification in differences. Second, we could explore the
possibility of cointegrating relationships. This, however, requires more theoretical
elaboration of the expected long-run association between the potentially cointe-
grating variables. Since the literature on panel cointegration is still in its early
stages of development (e.g. Pedroni 2000; Kao/Chiang 2000) and rather difficult
for the applied researcher to access (see Smith 2000 for an overview), we leave this
task to a future endeavor and focus on the shift to a model in first differences.10
4 Dynamic Specification in First Differences
A model in first differences focuses on systematic associations between the an-
nual changes in the variables – i.e. the short-term effects – while removing all
level variation (i.e. the long-run effect) from the data. As argued before, our deci-
sion in favor of this specification is solely motivated by the statistical properties of
the underlying data. Note that our data are I(1), which justifies the choice of a lag
length of 1 and, therefore, of first differences.
We do have second thoughts concerning the variables that refer to government
composition. If we take the first difference of these variables, we lose the infor-
mation about the strength of the leftist or Christian democracy in government
and keep only the information about its change. This implies that we make infer-
ences about the effect that the size of the change of, say, leftist party strength in
government has on the size of the change in public expenditure. By implication,
this approach assumes that a reduction in leftist party strength directly translates
into a decline in public expenditure. Given our knowledge from qualitative re-
search about the persistency and path-dependency of government programs (see,
e.g. Pierson 1996), such an assumption is only plausible if we claim that govern-
ments can fully and immediately change the level of public expenditure at their
                                                  
10 A more technical reason is that, in general, time series with T ≅ 30 are too short for
the estimation of reliable parameters in the cointegration framework (see Maddala/
Wu 1999).
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will. Instead, it is more reasonable to assume that parties in government can in-
fluence not the level of expenditure but the extent of expenditure growth during
their term in office. Thus, we are faced with a serious problem in the initial level
specification chosen by Garrett and Mitchell (2001), highlighted by the autore-
gression coefficient of near unity and the apparent nonstationarity of public ex-
penditure: The level of public expenditure should not be related to the strength of
leftist or Christian democratic parties in government during their term in office
but to the cumulative share of these parties in past terms, as advocated by Huber
and Stephens (2001). This variable, however, is nonstationary by definition in the
sense of an ever-increasing and thus non-constant mean, which returns us to the
problems discussed in section 3. But the share of these parties during a term is,
also by definition, the first difference of this cumulative measure. Therefore, by
shifting to this perspective, we move to a more plausible expectation about the
potential impact of the composition of government on public expenditure. Con-
sequently, we have decided to first-difference all variables in the Garrett/
Mitchell (2001) specification, except for the two variables referring to the
composition of government.
It remains an empirical question whether first-differencing fully removes the
cross-country and time variation that is captured by the fixed country and time ef-
fects. On the one hand, if there are systematic cross-country differences in the an-
nual expenditure growth, fixed country effects should capture enough variation
to attain statistical significance in an F-test. On the other hand, if there are com-
mon developments in public expenditure, we would expect significant time ef-
fects. The latter may well be the case in OECD countries: while the 1960s wit-
nessed a massive increase of the public sector in virtually all OECD countries, the
1980s were characterized by attempts at bringing that increase to a halt. Such
policy reorientation – though to different degrees and with some variation in the
exact timing for each country – are captured by time effects. Hence, in the models
presented in Tables 7 to 11, all variables except the composition of government
are first-differenced, and we still test for fixed effects.
The results of the first-difference specifications are presented in Tables 7 to 9.
First, Table 7 reports the estimates of the fixed effects model, similar to Table 1,
which accounts for the level information. A striking feature of the first-difference
model is, however, that the estimates do not vary considerably, which suggests a
robust empirical relationship. In all specifications we find a highly significant im-
pact of our core economic variables. Changes in unemployment are positively as-
sociated with changes in government expenditure, while the opposite holds for
economic growth. For example, in the specification with country effects (FE(C),
first column), a change of the economic growth rate (per capita) by 1 percentage
point is associated with a decrease in the change in government spending by 0.25
percentage points. Substantively, this indicates an income elasticity for public
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goods of less than unity, a result that is in line with most empirical findings (see
Mueller 1989: 324). The change in the dependency ratio turns out to be positively
correlated with government growth, as expected, and statistically significant. In
Table 7 Dynamic Specification in First Differences: Fixed Effects
∆ Total Government Expenditure as a % of GDP
FE(C) FE(T) FE(CT)
∆ Govt. Expendituret-1 0.231***
(0.045)
0.226***
(0.047)
0.188***
(0.048)
∆ Unemployment 0.552***
(0.075)
0.401***
(0.079)
0.423***
(0.080)
∆ GDP/capita growth −0.250***
(0.024)
−0.213***
(0.026)
−0.206***
(0.026)
∆ Dependency ratio 0.503**
(0.204)
0.436**
(0.206)
0.452**
(0.222)
Left cabinet portfolios −0.147
(0.206)
0.040
(0.145)
−0.249
(0.197)
Christian democratic portfolios −0.744
(0.474)
−0.069
(0.208)
−0.629
(0.459)
∆ Trade −0.015
(0.015)
−0.027
(0.021)
−0.023
(0.021)
∆ Low wage imports −0.012
(0.033)
0.020
(0.035)
0.014
(0.035)
∆ Foreign direct investment −0.224***
(0.072)
−0.120*
(0.071)
−0.134*
(0.072)
R2 0.428 0.461 0.520
N (Observations) 512 512 512
k (Coefficients) 26 40 56
F (Country effects) 0.80 .. 1.01
F (Time effects) 2.86*** 2.92***
F (Country & time effects) .. .. 2.22***
LM (CC), χ2 (136) 190.81*** 161.74* 162.22*
Mod. Wald (GH), χ2 (17) 337.03*** 440.48*** 362.37***
LM (AR1), χ2 (1) 2.03 1.32 1.30
Notes: see Table 1.
FE(C) = Fixed country effects; FE(T) = Fixed time effects; FE(CT) = Fixed country & time
effects.
Constant and fixed effects included but not reported.
.. = not applicable.
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contrast, apart from FDI, the political as well as the globalization variables are of
limited importance for explaining government spending. Further, as shown in the
F-tests on the significance of the country and time effects, we have to consider time
effects in our model. Since the F-test on the country effects in both the FE(C) and the
FE(CT) specifications indicates that the country effects are insignificant – which is
not unexpected since taking first differences wipes out the cross-country effects –
we end up with a model including time effects only – FE(T). Apart from the shift to
the difference specification, which is necessary as pointed out previously, this con-
stitutes a second major difference to the specification of Garrett and Mitchell (2001).
Table 8 Dynamic Specification in First Differences: Fixed Effects:
Correction for Heteroskedasticity and Cross-sectional
Correlation
∆ Total Government Expenditure as a % of GDP
WLS White PCSE
∆ Govt. Expenditure t-1 0.266***
(0.044)
0.226***
(0.055)
0.226***
(0.068)
∆ Unemployment 0.438***
(0.069)
0.401***
(0.085)
0.401***
(0.091)
∆ GDP/capita growth −0.216***
(0.023)
−0.213***
(0.030)
−0.213***
(0.033)
∆ Dependency ratio 0.348**
(0.157)
0.436**
(0.184)
0.436**
(0.213)
Left cabinet portfolios 0.154
(0.118)
0.039
(0.145)
0.039
(0.164)
Christian democratic portfolios −0.042
(0.161)
−0.069
(0.205)
−0.069
(0.212)
∆ Trade −0.031*
(0.018)
−0.027
(0.024)
−0.027
(0.026)
∆ Low wage imports 0.025
(0.028)
0.020
(0.031)
0.020
(0.038)
∆ Foreign direct investment −0.130**
(0.063)
−0.120
(0.100)
−0.120
(0.082)
LM (AR1), χ2 (1) 4.49** 1.32 1.32
Notes: see Table 1.
The models reproduce the FE(T) specification in Table 6. WLS refers to the GLS-trans-
formed estimator taking into account groupwise heteroskedasticity (Greene 2000: 594–
599), White refers to the OLS model with White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors and PCSE refers to OLS with Beck and Katz’s (1995) panel-corrected
standard errors.
Constant and fixed effects included but not reported.
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Table 9 Dynamic Specification in First Differences: Random Effects
∆ Total Government Expenditure as a % of GDP
RE(C) RE(T)
∆ Govt. Expenditure t-1 0.263***
(0.044)
0.249***
(0.045)
∆ Unemployment 0.523***
(0.073)
0.476***
(0.074)
∆ GDP/capita growth −0.259***
(0.024)
−0.240***
(0.024)
∆ Dependency ratio 0.450**
(0.190)
0.440**
(0.195)
Left cabinet portfolios 0.103
(0.151)
0.075
(0.146)
Christian democratic portfolios −0.114
(0.217)
−0.096
(0.210)
∆ Trade −0.016
(0.015)
−0.021
(0.017)
∆ Low wage imports −0.004
(0.033)
0.006
(0.033)
∆ Foreign direct investment −0.209***
(0.072)
−0.171**
(0.071)
R2 0.413 0.412
Median Theta 0.000 0.293
Nobs 512 512
Breusch-Pagan 1.23 23.67***
Hausman n.a.a 25.86***
Notes: see Table 1.
RE(C) = Random country effects; RE(T) = Random time effects.
Constant included but not reported.
a Not applicable because random effects estimator has degenerated to pooled estimator.
Table 8 presents the estimates of the fixed time effects – FE(T) – model of Table 7,
taking heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional correlation into account. First, we
estimated the WLS-transformed model, then we used the White correction for the
OLS standard errors, and finally we applied PCSEs as proposed by Beck and Katz
(1995). The WLS standard errors are much lower than those of the PCSE and
White-corrected ones. This finding is in line with Beck and Katz (1995), who have
emphasized that WLS gives downward-biased standard errors. As outlined
above, Beck and Katz (1995) have also stressed that in a correctly specified model,
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the standard errors of the OLS specification should not deviate considerably from
the PCSE ones. This is exactly the case in our situation, which, in turn, is an indi-
cation that our model in Table 7 is correctly specified. Finally, Table 9 presents the
results of the random effects model. We are interested in the question whether the
time effects, which have little relevance for the substantive argument, can be rep-
resented by a distributional assumption. Again, by applying a Hausman (1978)
test, we can reject the null of random effects and remain with the fixed time ef-
fects specification. Note that for the random country effects specification – RE(C)
– θ collapses to zero. Thus, the random country effects specification is not differ-
ent from the pooled OLS estimator because taking first differences removes cross-
sectional variation.
To conclude, in the first-difference specification we find overwhelming evidence
for a model with time effects. Most importantly, by testing for AR(1), we cannot
find residual autocorrelation in our first-differenced data, suggesting that our
dynamic specification does not suffer from endogeneity. Applying the panel-
corrected standard errors in this situation, as elaborated in Table 7, seems accept-
able. Differencing the data wipes out the country effects. Thus, the endogeneity
bias caused by the correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the
country effects vanishes (see Hsiao 1986: 75). In order to take into account the re-
maining endogeneity due to correlation of the lagged dependent variable and the
error term, it is usually suggested to apply more consistent estimation procedures
(such as IV or GMM; see Baltagi 2001: 131, Wawro 2000). However, Monte Carlo
simulations have shown that for an unbalanced panel, as in our case, and T = 30,
the FE performs just as well as or better than the alternatives (see Judson and
Owen 1999: 13). This is an additional justification for our specification.
In all specifications, the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is stable and
around 0.25, suggesting a persistency of spending decisions equaling about 25
percent. If one accepts the view that current spending decisions depend on the
previous year’s budget, notably due to indisposable positions in the budgetary
process) (e.g., wages and salaries of public employees), the magnitude of the
lagged dependent variable seems plausible.
5 Robustness and Stability Analysis
By estimating a single coefficient for the whole period, Garrett and Mitchell
(2001) assume a constant and stable globalization-welfare state nexus. However,
the impact of both globalization and political pressures on government spending
may well change over time. In addition, in applied work one is often confronted
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with structural breaks. Such breaks may be caused by economic shocks (e.g. the
oil crisis in the 1970s) or simply by changing statistical conventions. In the data
set of Garrett and Mitchell (2001), we suspect there are structural breaks espe-
cially for FDI, as is clearly shown in Figure 3 of the Appendix (notably for Bel-
gium, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland). To account for these consid-
erations, we estimate the first-differenced, fixed time-effects model of Table 8
with interaction dummies for three subperiods: 1964–1973 (up to the first oil cri-
sis), 1974–1983 (characterized by growing unemployment and inflation as well as
decreasing growth rates), and finally, 1984–1993, a period of stable economic
growth and, according to conventional wisdom, the emergence of globalization.
We interact these period dummies with our variables of interest, i.e. both the
partisan composition of government and the globalization variables. The results
are presented in Table 10.
Compared to our favored specification in Table 8 – FE(T)/PCSE – the coefficients
of the core economic variables, unemployment, economic growth, and the de-
pendency ratio, are almost unchanged. Most important, however, is that by ap-
plying the likelihood ratio (LR) tests on the (unrestricted) specification containing
period-specific coefficients for the core variables, we get results indicating a re-
jection of the null of significant differences between the period-specific effects. In
period-specific coefficients for the core variables, we get results indicating a re-
jection of the null of significant differences between the period-specific effects. In
other words, the association between government expenditure and partisan com-
position as well as globalization remains largely stable over time. This finding is
confirmed by the t-statistics of the coefficients: Again, our core economic vari-
ables are significant, whereas the only significant effects concerning partisanship
and globalization are those of trade and FDI, both in the period of 1984–1993. It is
worth noting that the coefficient on FDI reversed its sign between the late 1970s
and the 1980s. From a statistical point of view, this may be due to structural
breaks inherent in these series (see Figure 3 in the Appendix). From a substantive
point of view, this may be indicative of an impact of economic internationaliza-
tion: on average, an increase in foreign direct investment was associated with an
increase in government spending during the late 1970s/early 1980s, which sug-
gests that the compensation hypothesis was salient at that time. By contrast, the
efficiency hypothesis tends to be confirmed for the period since the mid-1980s.
Hence the efficiency-compensation debate might be resolved by the proposition
that governments first attempted to compensate their citizens for greater expo-
sure to the world market but later had to succumb to the pressures from growing
deficits and debt as well as from economic internationalization. However, this is
an interpretation based on rather weak findings that we do not wish to overem-
phasize.
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Table 10 Dynamic Specification in First Differences: Period-specific Slopes
∆ Total Government Expenditure
as a % of GDP
LR Test for
period-specific slopes
∆ Government expendituret-1 0.230***
(0.047)
∆ Unemployment 0.412***
(0.080)
∆ GDP/capita growth −0.207***
(0.026)
∆ Dependency ratio 0.458**
(0.223)
Left cabinet portfolios
1963–1973
0.146
(0.250)
Left cabinet portfolios
χ2 (2) = 1.15
Left cabinet portfolios
1974–1983
−0.178
(0.249)
Left cabinet portfolios
1984–1993
0.133
(0.264)
Christian democratic portfolios
1963–1973
−0.178
(0.354)
Christian democratic portfolios
χ2 (2) = 0.81
Christian democratic portfolios
1974–1983
0.164
(0.389)
Christian democratic portfolios
1984–1993
−0.277
(0.364)
∆ Trade 1963–1973 0.001
(0.053)
∆ Trade
χ2 (2) = 1.82
∆ Trade 1974–1983 −0.010
(0.031)
∆ Trade 1984–1993 −0.060*
(0.033)
∆ Low wage imports
1963–1973
0.080
(0.061)
∆ Low wage imports
χ2 (2) = 1.82
∆ Low wage imports
1974–1983
−0.029
(0.060)
∆ Low wage imports
1984–1993
0.015
(0.061)
∆ Foreign direct investments
1963–1973
−0.062
(0.217)
∆Foreign direct investments
χ2 (2) = 1.94
∆ Foreign direct investments
1974–1983
0.139
(0.211)
∆ Foreign direct investments
1984–1993
−0.157*
(0.083)
R2 0.512
Nobs 512
k (coefficients) 50
F (Time effects) 2.47***
LR (Period-specific slopes), χ2 (10) 9.09
LM (CC), χ2 () 153.77
Mod. Wald (GH), χ2 () 387.60***
LM (AR1), χ2 (1) 1.52
Notes: see Table 1; constant and fixed time effects included but not shown.
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Table 11 Jackknife Analysis
∆ Total Government Expenditure as a % of GDP
Minimum
coefficient
Country
excluded
Estimate Maximum
coefficient
Country
excluded
∆ Government
expenditure t-1 0.213 DNK 0.226 0.245 ITA
∆ Unemployment 0.368 CAN 0.401 0.444 IRL
∆ GDP/capita growth −0.234 IRL −0.213 −0.199 ITA
∆ Dependency ratio 0.397 SWE 0.436 0.501 NLD
Left cabinet
portfolios −0.005 FRA 0.040 0.124 SWE
Christian democratic
portfolios −0.143 BEL −0.069 0.024 DNK
∆ Trade −0.040 ITA −0.027 0.003 IRL
∆ Low wage
imports 0.007 NOR 0.020 0.046 AUT
∆ Foreign direct
investment −0.182 NOR −0.120 −0.065 SWE
Notes: Entries are coefficient estimates from FE(T) in Table 6 together with minimum and maximum coefficient
estimates resulting from re-estimates of the model while excluding each country one at a time. They show the
responsiveness of the coefficient estimates to the inclusion of particular countries.
Finally, as emphasized in Section 2 (see footnote 6), our attention should be de-
voted to the robustness of our results against the impact of cross-sectional out-
liers. To discover such effects we perform a Jacknife analysis (Efron/Tibshirani
1993: Ch. 11) on our favored FE(T)/PCSE specification of Table 8. In particular,
we re-estimate the model by excluding one country after the other. The resulting
minimum and maximum values of the point estimates are presented in Table 11.
The minimum values as well as the excluded country for which that estimate was
obtained are shown in the first double column, and the maximum ones in the last
double column. The point estimates of the entire sample (taken from Table 8) are
reported in the middle column. A glance at the partisanship variables shows us
that the coefficient estimates strongly depend on the countries included. The most
extreme lower and upper deviations from the estimated coefficient are caused by
the exclusion of France and Sweden for leftist governments and by the exclusion
of Belgium and Germany for Christian democratic governments. The other coeffi-
cients are much more stable. None of them, except trade, changes sign due to the
exclusion of a particular country. The most extreme coefficient estimates of the
domestic socioeconomic factors are within approximately a 10-percent range of
the coefficient estimate calculated by using the full set of countries. The economic
variables relating to the external effects (trade, imports from low-wage countries
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and FDI) are less stable – deviations of 50 percent to 100 percent of the coefficient
estimate are caused by the exclusion of a single country – which gives additional
salience to the inference derived from the lack of significance that there is no clear
effect. These findings clearly indicate that decisions on government expenditure
are driven by the domestic socioeconomic environment rather than by political or
globalization issues (as claimed by Garrett and Mitchell 2001).
6 Summary and Conclusions
It has become common practice in the empirical analysis of political economy to
use panel data for drawing inferences on a wide range of research topics. In fact,
data that combine cross-sectional and time-series information have given us new
insights into the course of political processes. However, despite these merits, our
paper calls for great caution in applying panel data in political economy. Exem-
plified by the controversy over the impact of globalization and the partisan com-
position of government on total government expenditure, we identify a lack of
concern about a consistent empirical specification. In particular, we have re-
estimated a model presented by Garrett and Mitchell (2001). Our findings may be
summarized as follows:
1. In general, panel data inferences are sensitive to the model specification. In
our context, the underlying data are highly persistent, and therefore the
specification has to focus on the time pattern of the data.
2. Introducing a lagged dependent variable to get rid of autocorrelation causes
additional problems, in particular if autocorrelation remains. Most impor-
tantly, the estimates become biased due to endogeneity. Our proposition for
this particular model is to specify an autoregressive model in first differences
with time effects, the latter taking into account common shocks. Testing for
remaining violations of the panel assumptions, we end up with a statistically
acceptable model that allows us to apply panel-corrected standard errors as
proposed by Beck and Katz (1995), although these hardly differ from OLS
standard errors, despite the fact that the tests for country-specific heteroske-
dasticity and cross-sectional correlation suggested the presence of such a re-
sidual structure. Apparently, these problems matter less in this particular
model.
3. It is rather unlikely that social phenomena, such as the globalization-welfare
state nexus considered by Garrett and Mitchell (2001) and subsequent stud-
ies, are stable over time. We take into account this argument by specifying a
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model with period-specific effects of the core variables, but we find no con-
vincing evidence that the lack of statistically significant estimates in the
model for the full period analyzed is due to systematic changes in the coeffi-
cients over time. However, the restricted number of observations from which
each of these parameters is estimated does not allow us to make a definite
judgement.
In sharp contrast to Garrett and Mitchell (2001), our empirical analysis indicates
that neither globalization nor the partisan composition of government play a de-
cisive role in explaining cross-country variation in the dynamics of government
expenditure. Hence, we find a confirmation neither of the efficiency hypothesis
nor of the compensation hypothesis. Instead, most parts of the dynamics in gov-
ernment expenditure are explained by the domestic economic environment such
as growth, unemployment, or the dependency ratio (for a similar conclusion, see
Castles 2001). Some of these may be affected by partisan politics or economic
globalization, but that is a different story. Therefore, while we have focused on
the statistical model used by Garrett and Mitchell (2001), much could be said
about the lack of theoretical foundations in their empirical model and the way in
which globalization interacts with politics to cause particular outcomes, among
which is the development of government expenditure dynamics.
Substantively, the move from a model in levels to a model in first differences im-
plies that the object of analysis has changed from long-term differences (i.e. the
level of public expenditure) to short-term adjustments (i.e. the growth of public
expenditure). We should not be too surprised that an analysis of short-run ad-
justments does not support propositions about long-run effects. Further, if we
compare the results of a purely cross-sectional ‘between model’ in levels with that
of our first-differenced specification, we can draw a second major conclusion:
While the former indicates an unmistakably positive effect of leftist cabinet port-
folios and a somewhat more ambiguous positive effect of Christian democratic
portfolios on the levels of public expenditure, the latter clearly rejects any parti-
san effects on the first differences. However, this result is not necessarily a con-
tradiction. Despite the shifting nature of cabinet portfolios, countries with a his-
torically strong social democracy (e.g., Sweden, Denmark, Austria) or Christian
democracy (e.g., Germany), or, conversely, a strong liberal tradition (e.g., USA,
Canada), tend to have prolonged periods with high values on these variables
during the period analyzed, too. Therefore, the country means of government
composition in the between-model practically serve as a proxy for the historical
power constellation. Since all countries exhibited an upward trend in public ex-
penditure during the period analyzed, the differences in mean public expenditure
are accounted for by the government composition variables. However, no sys-
tematic variation in growth is observable just because all countries experienced
the upward trend.
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Finally, what do our findings tell us about the usefulness of panel analysis for an-
swering the type of questions asked by comparative political economists? We
contend that those who are interested in the consequences of cross-country dif-
ferences in political institutions – that by definition exhibit little short-term varia-
tion – should be much more aware of the longitudinal dimension of panel data.
Neither persistency nor dynamics should be regarded as nuisances to be cor-
rected. Quite the contrary: the longitudinal dimension of panel data makes this
type of data ill-suited for answering research questions posed in a strictly cross-
sectional context. The solution is not to start attaching a variety of bells and whis-
tles to the model in order to correct autocorrelation or autoregression, but to pay
much more attention to the short-term dynamics themselves. And if a question
definitely refers to the cross-sectional dimension, it makes sense to answer that
question by emphasizing the cross-sectional dimension.
Long-term variation, of course, is the result of systematic variation in short-term
adjustments. This points to an important avenue for future research: the theoreti-
cal debate about partisan effects on short-term adjustments in government ex-
penditure is notoriously underdeveloped and sometimes even dismissed as ill-
guided (Huber/Stephens 2001: 36–38). However, if path-dependency has any
substantive meaning in the context of government expenditure, it is that political
actors usually change expenditure programs only at the margin. If one believes,
for instance, that the partisan composition affects the long-run political outcome,
it is caused by marginal changes in program designs. Therefore it is worthwhile
to study not only the long-run developments but also the short-run political-
economic processes. An important contribution in this regard would be the de-
velopment of theories of short-term adjustments on which empirical analysis
could be based.
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